Mysteries of the Region: Knowledge Dyamics In Silicon Valley by
John Seely Brown and
Paul Duguid Abstract For more than a century, commentators have predicted that industrial “clusters” would disappear with improvements in communications technology. Yet still clusters form, most noticeably in Silicon Valley, at the heart of the latest revolution in information technology, the Internet. How can such clusters be explained? We argue that collaborative practices and their contribution to the dynamics of knowledge are more important than communications technologies in explaining clusters. We advance a unitary, practice-based, account of both internal and the external flows of organizational knowledge. We then use this account to explain the importance of proximity to the movement of knowledge and hence the advantages of clustering, despite the disadvantages that come from losing knowledge to competitors. We sketch a matrix view of clusters and suggest that the details of the matrix explain why networks of knowledge have variable density and topography. In conclusion, we replace this simple matrix view with a richer ecological view of knowledge in regions. This helps explain both why regions are so strong and why they are so difficult to imitate. Mysteries of the Region: Knowledge Dyamics In Silicon Valley by John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air. Alfred
Marshall Been There, Done That? Despite all the recent insightful writings on “clusters” (Porter, 1998), “technopoles” and “innovative milieux” (Castells & Hall, 1994), or “regional advantage” (Saxenian, 1996), it can feel as though researchers are only adding footnotes to Alfred Marshall’s magisterial economic exploration of “localization,” written more than a century ago. For example, Saxenian’s study importantly shifts attention from economic issues to social and cultural ones. That shift recalls Marshall’s insight that in localizations “social forces co-operate with economic ones.” For their part, Castells and Hall insist on the historical determinants of regions. Silicon Valley, they note, goes back much further than the silicon chip or even the fabled garage of Hewlett and Packard. Its roots extend at least to the development of radio technologies before the First World War. Marshall would no doubt have approved such historicizing. He traced the roots of the south Lancashire steel industry in the nineteenth century, for example, to the settlement of smiths after the Norman Conquest in the eleventh century. Again, recent analyses have noted the importance of the lawyers, venture capitalists, marketing firms, and the like that have grown up to support the core firms of Silicon Valley. Kenney and von Burg (2000) insightfully refers to this as the “second economy” ; Lynn et al. (1996) as the “superstructure.” Both these approaches call to mind Marshall’s account of the “subsidiary” trades that develop around the primary firms of an industrial localization. Finally, analysts increasingly argue that the conventional dichotomy of firm and market inherent in the “transaction cost” view of business organization is too stark to explain something like Silicon Valley. With its complex array of subcontracts, cross-licenses, joint ventures, and so on, organizationally much of Silicon Valley falls into what Hennart (1993) calls the “swollen middle” between firm and market. Indeed, Gilson (1996) provocatively asks, “Is Silicon Valley--a complex network of shifting alliances, relationships, intermediaries, firms and investors--in fact a firm?" The heart of Marshall’s analysis, of course, concerns the way that industrial localization has collective, systemic properties, which fall somewhere between market and firm. [1]
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Each of the small blobs represents a different community of (a different) practice linked together in the firm. (We need to emphasize that this is highly schematic. It is not meant to preclude “U” shaped, “M” shaped, matrix, or other organizational forms. Equally, there usually is some overlap between communities within an organization, though we have not dealt with this important issue here. ) The solid vertical lines represent the connections established by business processes within the firm. The open lateral lines, by contrast, represent the network-of-practice connections that link each of those communities to other communities of similar practices in different firms. Accountants in one firm, for example, have implicit, practice-based links—through their professional newsletters and journals, though informal contacts, and so forth—to accountants in another. Consequently, a similar but orthogonal diagram can represent a network, as follows:
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Here the broken dense lines running vertically represent the links within the different firms to which these communities belong, while the horizontal links represent the networks of practice running between them and along which knowledge about that practice will more easily flow. Professional associations, which lie along these lines, have often been important routes for propagating the spread of new knowledge (Constant, 1987).
The links across such a network may be fairly distant. Most people in a large professional association, for example, are unknown to one another. Even those from different firms that do know one another may meet only sporadically at national conference. This sort of distance puts significant limits on the amount of knowledge that can be shared. But such links can also be fairly close—as they are, of course, in clusters. Here, people in similar jobs who see each other every day in a carpool, who once worked together and have kept in touch because they are still neighbors, or whose kids are on the same team will tend to intensify the relations within a network of practice. (Indeed, connections can become so dense that intra-firm communities of practice may form de facto. This can happen in joint ventures when engineers from different partners, for example, work closely together across firm boundaries. ) Clusters provide the sort of density that allows for proximity and interaction like this.
Consequently in clusters, knowledge, supported on the rails of practice but accelerated by interpersonal relations, can travel particularly easily between different organizations.
The relations of the region, then, comprising both network and organizational links, can be represented as follows.
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Again, the vertical lines represent organizations vertically integrating diverse practices, while, conversely, the horizontal lines are networks linking similar practitioners in diverse organizations. The organizations, of course, are not all the same. Some may be universities, some government agencies (the military, after all, was long one of the most important organizations in Silicon Valley), and many will be private firms. Depending on their constitution, these different organizations will integrate different practices in different ways. In the Valley, for example, some firms internalize almost all functions in a sweep from finance to fulfillment. Some are only Marshall’s “subsidiary” trades—venture capitalists, marketing firms, fabricators, and the like. And others are stripped down to a few basic functions—research and engineering but not manufacturing, for example. Hence, in our diagram some of the firms represented intersect many of the networks of practice that run throughout the region, others only a few. The latter may then integrate complementary functions not under the hierarchical order of a firm, but through market relations of subcontracting or through some of the other hybrid arrangements that, as we mentioned, fall somewhere between market and firm. These hybrid links are most easily formed where interfirm relations are close, the links between them dense. This sort of density is particularly important in fast-changing areas of the economy, where all partners to a venture need to be able to change simultaneously and synchronously.
Such density doesn’t only allow partners to coordinate closely. It also allows people to differentiate finely between different firms, finding the most apt for a particular task or idea. And again this discrimination tends to promote leakiness. Because of the proximity, the horizontal links of a network will be more like those found in a community of practice than like the distant sort found across a large professional association. Here, as we have argued, knowledge can leak more readily and successfully. Moreover, as Arrow (1984) has argued, classic knowledge workers—scientists, academic researchers, and the like—are often as loyal to the knowledge they work with as to the organizations they work for. Consequently new ideas that are going nowhere across the gulfs within an organization may not just leak but get a significant push towards fellow practitioners who, those pushing know, can give the idea a better home.
In all, as a consequence of the density and differentiation within a cluster, localization can make efficient use of people and ideas. In an account of labor movements in Silicon Valley, Angel (2000) notes that “the decisions of individual workers, whether to stay within an existing employer or to change jobs, would appear to be a highly efficient means through which to deploy labor skills and experience within the local labor market.” These fluid movements are most likely, Angel suggests, when likely employers are clustered together, when there’s a great deal of knowledge “in the air” about who can do what, when the costs of moving are low (no need to sell your house or move the kids to a new school), and when there’s a “constant market for skill.”
Similarly, localization promotes fluidity of ideas (what we are calling leakiness), by lowering the cost (in terms of knowledge dissemination) of moving them. If a firm fails to use them effectively, ideas, like people, are unlikely to stick around for long. And where informal connections are dense and the mysteries of practice are in the air, the inefficiencies that keep ideas within isolated firms, hedged around by IP strategies and ignorance, are less of a constraint on mobility. People in closely situated and closely related organizations will not be ignorant of what the ideas might signify and how to use them. So ideas will travel (or be pushed or pulled) along networks of practice until they are used. One of the great motivating forces here, as we have noted, is venture capital (see Kenney & Florida, 2000), which tempts both people and ideas to move out of existing firms into start-ups. (That people and ideas move in similar directions is not surprising, given our argument that ideas cling very closely to people and travel along rails built by practice. )
Structure and Spontaneity
As ideas and people move rapidly, driven by venture capital, it’s easy to believe that a cluster like Silicon Valley conforms to the “Law of the Microcosm” (Gilder, 1989) or the “Law of Diminishing firms” (Downs & Mui, 1998). Such laws predict that ultimately there is no place for the vertical integration of communities, which we have suggested is the essence of the firm. All such relations will dissolve in the marketplace. Such conclusions, we believe, misunderstand Marshall and misread Silicon Valley. Marshall’s localizations, though populated with small, specialist firms, do not represent a shift from firm to market. Rather they lie adeptly between firm and market, drawing on both.
Similarly, Silicon Valley does not represent a relentless progress from large firm to small so much as a symbiotic relationship between the two. Small firms, after all, are often the product of large ones. As Kogut, Walker, and Kim (1995) show, large firms often spin off the small to test markets, explore niches, or develop networks of users committed to a particular standard. Certainly, this is not always the case. Often start-ups are the result of a competitive departure, when disappointed employees leave to form a rival, much as the founders of Intel left Fairchild. Nonetheless, whether the spin-out was friendly or hostile, it is important not to overlook “spin-ins,” which move in the opposite directions as large firms take small firms in. Some firms in the Valley, like Cisco Systems, seem masterful at spinning in and remaining coherent. Indeed, just as many spin-outs are deliberate, so many apparently independent start-ups are really designed to be spun in. (Ferguson’s Vermeer Technologies (Ferguson, 1999), for example, seems to have been designed principally to be acquired by a large firm, which it was. ) And of course, some that are not taken in, grow instead to be even bigger than their forbears, as Intel did.
Indeed, the reciprocating movements of the Valley need to be read as an elaborate balance between stabilizing structure, on the one hand, and dynamic spontaneity, on the other. Venture capital, as we have suggested, plays an important role, in pulling ideas and people out of large firms and into start-ups. Playing this role, they usefully destabilize the “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1995) of established firms, the “tradition” of long-term networks (Constant, 1987), or the simple reproduction (Lave & Wenger, 1991) of communities of practice. In this they are playing a vital part in Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction.
But venture capital thrives on capital gains, which in turn rely on the explosive growth of new firms. By its very nature, it doesn’t hang around for profits that come from steady income streams. For this a different process takes over, one that is less spectacular and gets less attention. Now the firms to which the venture capitalists played destructive midwife must construct a structure capable of continuous innovation. They must establish practices, build traditions, and establish core competencies. At this stage, the creative abrasion that comes from holding things together, rather than creative destruction that comes from pulling them apart, becomes important. The destruction and the construction are obviously two quite different processes calling for quite different skills. (Jim Clark of Silicon Graphics and Netscape, as the Economist (1999) points out, has proved himself very good at starting business but poor at running them. ) But each depends on the other. For ultimately if there is no promise of long-term profitability, there will be no short term, explosive growth. Without a stable future for the firms at issue, IPOs are no more than Ponzi schemes.
So undoubtedly, small firms will continue to emerge. And certainly large ones will come under repeated attack. But large ones will continue to grow as well and small ones will continue to turn into large ones. Regions are much more complex arrangements than the one-way progression from large to small.
Reach and Reciprocity
As we try to understand the complexities of the regional matrix in terms of structure and spontaneity, it’s important to see that such a matrix also balances reach and reciprocity. Market structures, as Hayek (1945) famously showed, achieve remarkable reach through the information available in the price system. In working markets, price signals the state of supply and demand over global distances. And, in a sense, it is this sort of reach that Marshall seems to believe will come with cheaper communications technology. Firms will be free to locate “near to the consumers who will purchase their wares” without losing what, with less efficient communication, localization provided.
But Hayek’s market works by obliterating the details of local knowledge and the minutiae of practice. Reducing all these to price, it makes such knowledge and practice (which are hard to fathom from a distance) superfluous for the purpose of exchange. But as we have been arguing, such things are not superfluous for the purposes of learning, innovating, sharing practice, circulating new, actionable knowledge, and the like. (Markets, as Arrow (1984) convincingly argued, are not well adapted for knowledge. ) For these, extensive reach, whether offered by markets or by technology, can be highly problematic, as the survival of Marshall’s localizations, particularly in knowledge-dense industries, despite the cheapening of the “means of communication,” argues. More than reach, learning, innovating, sharing practices, and circulating inchoate knowledge all require reciprocity—close interaction and mutual exchanges among the people involved. The links between communities of practice within our matrix (both horizontal and vertical) are two-way links that reflect dense, interpersonal, and often face-to-face interactions. Hence, they are not indifferent to distance.
The necessary reciprocity might be seen, for example, in the workings of the universities within the region. While canonically these are assumed to generate knowledge that passes out into the region, in fact the flow goes both ways. All the schools and departments closely connected to firms in the region—computer science, engineering, business, for example—live by two-way traffic. Faculty and students carry ideas to the firms, helping the firms to develop their knowledge. But the schools reciprocally develop their knowledge through visits—for talks, seminars, tutorials, and so on—from people who work in the region’s firms. Similarly, faculty consulting in the region and students engaged in internships carry knowledge both ways. The reciprocity is also evident in much of the subcontracting and joint venturing of the region. As Saxenian (2000) shows, firms like Sun and Apple insist on having their most important suppliers close by. Distant connections, she suggests, are inadequate for the constant cycle of ideas back and forth needed to make subcontracting in dynamic knowledge industries work. No contracts can be written to deal with the contingencies involved when specifications must change at the pace of change in the Valley. And even if they could, they could never be enforced. Instead, these agreements must rely on personal connections and trust. Again, reciprocity seems to be needed to develop the grounds for trust. Cohen and Fields (1999) argue persuasively that the Valley is not a site of the sort of long-term social capital and trust that Putnam (1995) describes based on his experiences in the “Third Italy.” The networks of family relations Putnam relies on do not exist in Santa Clara County, where almost everyone seems to have come from somewhere else. Instead, the Valley seems more to give rise to what Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer (1966) call “swift trust,” a trust that can develop over short, intense periods of interaction.
Again, for this sort of trust, close interdependent interaction and reciprocity, and not distal communications, seem particularly important, as indeed, do durable networks of practice. Arguing against Putnam, Cohen and Fields conclude by arguing “the sequence runs from performance to trust, not from community.” We suspect that they oversimplify the question a little. As we have been arguing, reliable performance (or practice) builds communities and networks, and out of this can come trust. But these are not the familial communities of Northern Italy. They are the workplace communities developed as people work together.
From Matrix to Ecology
We have been trying to explain these complexities of the region in terms of a simple two-dimensional matrix. With each line we write it becomes more difficult. It’s hard to see structure and spontaneity in a matrix. You might see reach and reciprocity, but not the complex feedback loops that develop as a result of reciprocity; nor the symbiosis that leads to swift trust; nor the way communities seem to spill over the borders marked by firms and networks ("the whole idea of a firm with definite boundaries cannot be maintained intact,” as Kenneth Arrow (1984) noted while contemplating flows of knowledge and information); nor the constantly changing relations (firm, market, hybrid) that ripple across the region; nor the spaces that new firms occupy.
In all, it seems more useful to switch, as others have, to an ecological metaphor for the region. Seeing the region as an ecology that plays home to multiple species but whose growth is ultimately a collective process does much more justice both to Marshall’s insight and the richness of regions like Silicon Valley. For the ecological view provides a systemic perspective. What is good for the ecosystem as a whole is not necessarily good for individual species or firms. Indeed, some of these may have to die for the region as a whole to survive. (Deaths in Silicon Valley get much less attention than births—though see Freeman (1990)). Conversely, protecting individual species, as many working to build a region try to do, may be counterproductive.
The leaking of proprietary knowledge may represent a significant loss to the firm that loses it. If it flows to where it will be more effectively used, the region as a whole, by contrast, gains. Moreover, the firm faced with such a loss may try to seal itself off from the system as a whole. But such isolation, as Saxenian (1996) and Mounier-Khun (1994) indicate, can be quite damaging. Firms that feed into the ecology will, by the same routes (in particular, networks of practice), feed off it. Closing off these routes isolates a firm in a situation where isolation easily means death. The ecological view helps understand why Marshall’s focus on the means of communication limited his otherwise expansive view of localization. From the ecological perspective, the means of communication are only a small part of the overall complexity of the knowledge dynamics of the region. Ecological robustness is built—mysteries are put in the air—through shared practice, face-to-face contacts, reciprocity, and swift trust, all generated within networks of practice and communities of practice. New communications technologies can certainly reinforce these. It is more doubtful that they can readily replace them.
An ecological perspective also addresses the burning question of replication. Throughout the world, people are trying to imitate Silicon Valley by creating what Castells and Hall (1994) call “technopoles.” Politicians and business groups are seeking to “bootstrap” new hi-tech clusters in their regions in order to compete with the established ones and propel themselves from the periphery to the center of the knowledge economy. Such ventures, Castells and Hall argue, would “have to be launched on a huge scale,” setting in place a large number of interdependent organizations, institutions, and networks at simultaneously. But the problem is probably not simply one of scale and cost. Even if these costs, which could clearly be enormous (replicating even part of the universities and colleges of Stanford, Berkeley, San Jose State, and Santa Clara College along with the infrastructure of the Valley would be prohibitive) could be met, they are surely not enough. For the Valley and its residents embody a situated, shared experience that has been developed over time and in practice. Knowledge ecosystems, Marshall’s history, on the one hand, and Silicon Valley’s present, on the other, argue, develop over time, developing connections between participants until they reach a critical mass and take on a collective dynamic all of their own. By which time, the units in the whole are not only heavily interdependent, but also path dependent, reflecting the cumulative, participatory practices that have brought them to this point. In all, when regions have reached a point where the mysteries are in the air, if these are mysteries of any great worth, it has probably taken a great deal of time, effort, experience, and trial and error to get them up there.
Our argument is not intended to dismiss attempts to develop strong regional competencies. Quite the reverse. Unlike those who assume the death of distance, we believe “regional advantage” will play a significant economic role well into the future and that those who do not want to be marginalized must try to develop their own regional strengths. Our point, rather, is that these collective competencies are grown organically, not simply implemented mechanically. Aspiring regions can clearly learn from established ones, but because local factors (of culture, institutional forms, and so forth) contribute critically to localization, it would be a mistake (and probably an expensive one) for aspirants simply to imitate the established.
Conclusion
At the outset, we suggested that, given the persistence of clusters despite the cheapening of the means of communication, the two critical questions to address were “why and where": Why do clusters persist? and, given that the modern economy has seen plenty of disagglomeration, Where might we expect to find them? Our answer to Why? is that clusters persist despite advances in communications technologies because, marvelous though many of these technologies are and extensive though their reach is, they do not have the necessary reciprocity to spread fast-breaking knowledge. In championing the distal powers of new communications technologies to spread information, prognostications to easily underestimate the richness of face-to-face interactions and local communications to spreading knowledge.
The answer to Why? then provides the answer to Where? Though he hints that clusters might continue to exist, Marshall, as we argued, offers no clear idea of where they will continue to exist. We, by contrast, have tried to show that what demands localization meets. They are the demands of knowledge. At least with the current generation of communications technologies, clusters will continue to exist in exactly those industries where fast-breaking knowledge is at a premium. Consequently, as we have suggested, those wanting to develop a robust knowledge economy need to learn how to develop (and not simply imitate) a robust knowledge ecology.
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[1] The hybrid character of localization may be true of more than industrial organization. See Duguid & Silva Lopes (1999).
[2] Formal components of benchmarking can also involve selling your competitors the very tools you use to keep yourself ahead. Hewlett-Packard, for instance, created an important market by selling its high-quality testing tools although these inevitably gave its competitors the means to improve their products.
[3] Networks of practice are similar the “occupational communities” discussed by van Maanen and Barley (1984). Part of our point in changing the terminology is to direct attention from the “community” aspect of such groups, to the centrality of practice in these networks.
[4] Constant also shows how such associations can stop the flow of knowledge. Professional antibodies, like corporate antibodies, may emerge when new ideas threaten.
[6] In the rapidly changing world of modern, high-tech innovation, building a structure for creative abrasion may be much more of a challenge than unleashing the spontaneity of creative destruction, yet the former tends to get far less attention.